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Abstract
The resource-based approach is an emerging framework that has
stimulated discussion between scholars from three research
perspectives. First, the resource-based view incorporates
traditional strategy insights concerning a firm's distinctive
competencies and heterogenous capabilities. The resource-based
approach also provides value-added theoretical propositions that
are testable within the diversification strategy literature.
Second, the resource-based view fits comfortably within the
organizational economics paradigm. Third, the resource-based
view is complementary to industrial organization research. The
resource-based view provides a framework for increasing dialogue
between scholars from these important research areas within the
conversation of strategic management. Resource-based studies
that give simultaneous attention to each of these research
programs are suggested.
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THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW WITHIN
THE CONVERSATION OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
McCloskey (1985) persuasively argues that "good science is
good conversation" . The resource-based view is good management
science, properly speaking, because it stimulates good
conversation within the strategic management field. The
resource-based approach (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt 1984) is
attracting the attention of a growing number of researchers
precisely because the framework encourages a sustainable dialogue
between scholars from a variety of perspectives.
In particular, three major research programs are currently
intertwined in the resource-based framework. First, the
resource-based view incorporates concepts from mainstream
strategy research. Distinctive competencies (Andrews, 1971;
Ansoff, 1965) of heterogenous firms, for example, are a
fundamental component of the resource-based view. Moreover, the
resource-based theory is concerned with the rate, direction and
performance implications of diversification strategy; areas of
considerable focus in the strategy field (Ramanujam &
Varadarajan, 1989)
.
Second, the resource-based approach fits comfortably within
the conversation of organizational economics (Barney & Ouchi,
1986) . Third, the resource-based approach is complementary to
industrial organization analysis (Bain, 1968; Porter 1980;
Stigler, 1968) . The resource-based view not only stimulates
conversation within mainstream strategy research, organizational
economics and industrial organization research but it also
provides a framework for increased discussion between these
research perspectives. Future resource-based studies that give
simultaneous attention to these three research programs are
suggested.
Resource-based theory within
the conversation of strategy
Over 15 years ago, Bowman suggested that strategy could be
viewed as a "continuing search for rent" (1974, p. 74). Rent is
defined as the return in excess of a resource owner's opportunity
costs (Krueger, 1974; Tollison, 1982). A resource may be
conveniently classified under a few headings — for example,
land and equipment, labor (including workers' capabilities and
knowledge), and capital (organizational, tangible and intangible)
— but the sub-division of resources may proceed as far as is
useful for the problem at hand (Penrose, 1959, p. 74).
The generation of above-normal rates of return (i.e. rents)
is the focus of analysis for competitive advantage (Porter,
1985) . Several types of rent may be usefully distinguished.
First, rent may be achieved by owning a valuable resource that is
scarce (Ricardo, 1817) . Resources yielding Ricardian rents
include ownership of valuable land, locational advantages,
patents and copyrights. Second, monopoly rents may be achieved
by government protection or by collusive arrangements when
barriers to potential competitors are high (Bain, 1968) . Third,
entrepreneurial rent may be achieved by risk-taking and
entrepreneurial insight (Rumelt, 1987; Schumpeter, 1934).
Finally, the firm may be able to appropriate rents when
resources are firm-specific. For example, a worker's skill and
knowledge may increase the value of the firm by $60,000. If the
worker's skill can be used by many firms in the industry, then
the worker will be able to bid up the price (wage) of her
services to receive $60,000. The firm, in this case, will not be
able to appropriate rents. However, consider a second scenario
where some of the worker's knowledge provides value that is firm-
specific. For example, her knowledge and skill would increase
the value of other firms by only $38,000. The difference between
the first-best and second-best use value of a resource — the so-
called quasi-rent (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978) — in this
case, is $22,000 and is precisely the amount that a firm may
appropriate to achieve above-normal returns. Similarly, quasi-
rents are appropriable from idiosyncratic physical capital and
dedicated assets (Williamson, 1979)
.
The above example illustrates a general principle that may
be derived from a synthesis of a number of contributions in the
resource-based literature and is summarized by Peteraf (1990)
:
The existence and maintenance of rents depend upon a lack of
competition in either acquiring or developing resources. Rents
derived from resources which are simultaneously superior, imper-
fectly imitable, and non-substitutable, will not be competed away
if they are nontradeable or traded in imperfect factor-markets.
The resource-based view incorporates the insights of the
early seminal contributions to strategic management in order to
explain how firms generate rents. The traditional concept of
strategy (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965) considers the resource
position of the firm. A firm selects its strategy to generate
rents based upon their resource capabilities. Organizations
with the strategic capability to focus and coordinate human
effort and the ability to effectively evaluate the resource
position of the firm in terms of strengths and weaknesses have a
strong basis for competitive advantage (Andrews, 1971)
.
The firm's unique capabilities in terms of technical know-
how and managerial ability are important sources of heterogeneity
that may result in sustained competitive advantage. In
particular, distinctive competence in one or more of the firm's
value-chain functions (Porter, 1985) may enable the firm to
generate rents from a resource advantage (Hitt & Ireland, 1985)
.
Distinctive competence is a function of the resources a firm
possesses at any point in time. Penrose argues that: "It is the
heterogeneity ... of the productive services available or
potentially available from its resources that gives each firm its
unique character" (1959, p. 75). For example, top management in
a diversified enterprise can be a significant and distinctive
skill if it uniquely contributes to the sustained profitability
of the enterprise (Miles & Cameron, 1982)
.
A firm may achieve rents not because it has better
resources, but rather it makes better use of its resources
(Penrose, 1959, p. 54). The firm may make better use of human
capital by assigning workers correctly to where they have higher
productivity in the organization (Prescott & Visscher, 1980) , and
the firm may make better allocations of financial capital toward
high yield uses (Williamson, 1975)
.
There is a rich connection between the firm's resources,
distinctive competencies and the x dominant logic 1 (Prahalad &
Bettis, 1986) of the managerial team which drives the
diversification process. Penrose argues that resources "shape
the scope and direction of the search for knowledge" (1959,
p. 77). The services that resources will yield depend upon the
dominant logic of the top management team, but the development of
the dominant logic of the top managerial team is partly shaped by
the resources they deal with.
Firm diversification may also be based on similar production
technologies and the exploitation of science-based research
(Rumelt, 1974) . Thus, diversification may be based on trans-
ferring skills by one or more of the value-creation functions
(human resource management, manufacturing & information systems)
.
The resource-based view contributes to the large stream of
research on diversification strategy (Ramanujam & Varadarajan,
1989) in three areas: First, the resource-based approach
considers the motives for, and limitations of, diversified growth
(via internal development and mergers & acquisitions) . Second,
the resource-based approach provides a theoretical perspective
for predicting the direction of diversification. Third, the
resource-based view provides a theoretical rationale for
predicting superior performance for certain categories of related
diversification.
Penrose (1959) provides a seminal contribution in the
resource-based tradition. Fundamentally, it is the resources of
the firm which limit the choice of markets it may enter, and the
levels of profits it may expect (Wernerfelt, 1989) . Key resource
constraints include: (1) shortage of labor or physical inputs;
(2) shortage of finance; (3) lack of suitable investment
opportunities; and (4) lack of sufficient managerial capacity.
The financial and demand constraints are generally assumed away
by Penrose as being beyond the managerial constraint. Penrose
(1959) considers the growth of the firm as limited only in the
long-run by its internal management resources.
The total managerial services that a firm requires at a
point in time is partly constrained by the necessity to run the
firm at its current size, and is partly required to carry out
expansionary ventures with respect to new products and expansion
generally (Gort, 1962; Marris, 1964). Even with a constant
managerial workforce the firm will expand because as each new
product becomes established, its operations become more
standardized and less demanding of managerial services. A fixed
amount of managerial services for expansion through time induces
continuous growth.
Thus, there is a learning effect (Spence, 1981) . As
managers become more experienced at running the operations of
their firms, managerial services are released for expansion
without any fall in the effectiveness with which existing
operations are run. Allowing for diversification and a
reasonably functioning capital market, firms will grow rapidly
given the necessary managerial resources (Hay & Morris, 1979)
.
The optimum growth rate of the firm is mainly a function of
the optimal growth rate of managers (Figure 1) . Point m
indicates that some growth is feasible even with the same number
of managers. New managerial recruits increase the growth
potential of the firm. However, the training of new managers and
the integration of them into the work-force occupies some of the
time and effort of existing managers, and thus reduces the
managerial services available for expansion. Here g is the
maximum growth rate of the firm and the optimal growth rate of
managers is M.
Insert Figure 1 about here
This managerial constraint on the growth rate of the firm,
the so-called "Penrose effect" (Uzawa, 1969) , suggests that fast-
growing firms in one period tend to experience slower growth in
the next period. Growth' requires resources which are least
likely to be available with a plant that has just expanded
considerably and are most likely to be fulfilled by a plant which
has been in a lull. Hence, the Penrose effect suggests a
negative correlation between growth rates in successive periods.
Case studies (Richardson, 1964) , formal models (Slater 1980;
Uzawa, 19 69) , and econometric tests (Shen, 197 0) provide support
for the Penrose effect.
In addition to analyzing the limits of the rate of a firm's
growth, Penrose (1959) also examines the motives for expansion.
It is rare for all units to be operating at the same speed and
capacity, and this phenomenon creates an internal inducement for
firm growth. Penrose (1985, p. 13) presents a resource approach
arguing that firms are collections of physical, human and
intangible assets. Unused productive services from existing
resources present a "jig-saw puzzle" for balancing processes
(Penrose, 1959, p. 70). Excess capacity due to indivisibilities,
and cyclical demand, to a large extent drives the diversification
process (Caves, 1980; Chandler, 1962)
.
The firm's capability lies upstream from the end-product —
it resides in skills, capacities, and resources which find a
variety of end uses (Teece, 1982) . Excess physical capacity
leads to related diversification if the capacity is end-product
specific (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1988)
.
At all times there exists within every firm, pools of unused
productive services, and these, together with the changing
knowledge of management, create unique productive opportunities
for each firm (Chandler, 1977; Teece, 1980). Penrose argues
that there is a "virtuous circle" (1959, p. 73) in which the
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process of growth necessitates specialization but specialization
necessitates growth and diversification to fully utilize unused
productive services. Thus, specialization induces diversifica-
tion.
As a plant adjusts to its current scale of operations, the
learning process frees resources for alternative uses (Fiol &
Lyles, 1985) . This creates a built-in pressure for growth. An
efficient plant may normally grow at some optimal rate rather
than remain at "the" optimal size.
Rubin (1973) formally models firms' diversification
decisions according to Penrose's theory. He assumes that firms
cannot costlessly divest fixed assets in the short-run and that
expansion (through acquisition or internal development) utilizes
existing managerial resources which implies that managerial
services constrain the growth of firms. Rubin's model considers
resources which can be used either for producing output or for
training new resources. This assumption is incorporated into a
dynamic programming theory of the firm. Rubin's model
illustrates Penrose's thesis that there is no optimal size for a
firm. At any point in time there is an optimal growth rate.
Lemelin (1979) extends Rubin's model to include internal
resource transfer costs, imperfectly competitive resource
markets, and risk aversion. The firm is modeled as a collection
of particular resources worth more to the firm than their market
value due to high switching costs. Some of these resources are
normally freed as know-how is gained, and as ongoing activities
become routinized. Diversification is the observable outcome of
a dynamic internal growth process. An optimal growth of the firm
involves a balance between exploitation of existing resources and
development of new resources (Penrose, 1959; Rubin 1973;
Wernerfelt, 1984)
.
In addition to providing insights on the rate of the growth
of the firm, the resource-based approach provides value-added
theoretical explanations for the direction of a firm's
diversification. The direction of a firm's diversification is
due to the nature of its available resources, and the market
opportunities in the environment, with each firm seeking the most
profitable opportunities in which to apply its set of available
resources.
Several econometric studies support the resource-based
theory that an enterprise's firm-specific resources serve as the
driving force for its diversification strategy. Lemelin (1982)
finds that the more closely an industry is related to a firm's
primary activity, the more likely it is to be chosen for
diversification. Diversification occurs between pairs of
industries that exchange goods and services, belong to the same
category of industries in terms of buyer-supplier relationships,
are science-based and have similar input requirements. Lemelin
(1982) also finds that industries assigned to categories of
producer goods, consumer convenience goods and consumer
nonconvenience goods are more likely to diversify into other
industries assigned to the same category. Lemelin (1982) argues
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that this pattern is consistent with the resource-based
hypothesis that firms attempt to transfer intangible capital
among related activities.
MacDonald (1985) finds that firms are more likely to enter
industries that were related to their primary activities. R&D
intensive firms channel their diversification toward R&D
intensive industries. R&D expenditure is a reasonably effective
proxy for capturing an enterprise's endowment of unique knowledge
possessed by individuals and teams within the organization
(Caves, 1982) . Thus, the diversification pattern that MacDonald
(1985) finds may reflect the transfer of shareable idiosyncratic
organizational and intangible capital among related activities
(Prescott & Visscher, 1980; Williamson, 1985)
.
Similarly, Stewart, Harris & Carleton (1984) find a very
strong positive relationship between the advertising intensity of
the acquiring firm's primary industry and the advertising
intensity of the acquired firm's primary industry. Advertising
expenditure is a reasonably effective proxy for capturing a
firm's intangible assets (such as brand name and reputation)
.
Thus, once again, the pattern of the direction of diversification
may reflect the firm's attempts to transfer these invisible
assets (Itami, 1987)
.
Montgomery & Hariharan (1987) supply further support for the
resource-based view that the resource profile of the diversifying
firm is critical in predicting the resource characteristics of
the destination industry. While previous empirical research,
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discussed above, assigned firms to their primary industry and
studied the relationship between these primary (origin)
industries and destination industries, Montgomery & Hariharan
(1987) provide a significant value-added contribution by using
the FTC Line-of-Business (LB) data to consider the resource
profile of diversifying firms. Montgomery & Hariharan (1987)
find strong empirical evidence to reject the hypothesis that the
direction of diversification occurs at random. They find that a
firms' s competencies and intangible assets in advertising and R&D
explains the direction of diversification strategy. The
productive services of these resources are a selective force in
determining the direction of diversification (Penrose, 1959,
p. 87) .
These empirical studies suggest that firm-specific resources
and relatedness of activities are important variables in the
diversification process. Companies grow in the directions set by
their capabilities and these capabilities slowly expand and
change (Penrose, 1959) . DuPont, for example, moved from a basis
in nitro-cellulose explosives to cellulose lacquers, artificial
leather, plastics, rayon and cellophane, and from a basis in coal
tar dyestuffs into a wider range of synthetic organic chemicals,
nylon, and synthetic rubber (Richardson, 1972) . The resource-
based theory and empirical studies suggest that Dupont ' s pattern
of related diversification is the rule, rather than the
exception.
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The resource-based discussion of the diversification
—
performance linkage is embedded within the more general question
of whether any strategy that the firm utilizes makes a
difference. There still is an important debate concerning the
significance of firm effects as opposed to industry effects on
performance. While Schmalensee (1985) does not find support for
the existence of firm effects, several other studies find
significant firm effects (Cubbin & Geroski, 1987; Duhaime &
Stimpert, 1990; Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989; Jacobsen, 1988;
Mueller, 1977, 1986; Rumelt, 1989; Scott & Pascoe, 1986;
Vasconcellos & Hambrick, 1989; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988).
Rumelt (1987) , applying a variance components analysis to
rates of return on capital displayed by 1,292 U.S. corporations
over a twenty-year period finds that the variance in long-run
profitability within industries was three to five times larger
than the variance across industries. Clearly, the important
sources of rents in this data set are firm-specific rather than
the result of industry attractiveness.
Since the preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that
firms may influence their rent stream, the next question is: What
is the nature of these firm effects? Two important empirical
studies (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Wernerfelt & Montgomery,
1988) suggest that the resource-based theory of the firm provides
a theoretical underpinning for explaining and predicting
significant firm effects. A resource-based theory of
diversification suggests that firm effects might exist in the
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form of focus effects. They investigate the proposition that
widely diversified (less-focused) firms are unable to transfer
their competencies to a host of different markets. They argue
that the resource-based theory of diversification is helpful in
explaining the absolute performance of related diversifiers
relative to unrelated diversifiers. They make two points to
support this argument: (1) wider diversification suggests the
presence of less firm-specific resources that normally yield
lower rents; (2) a given resource will lose more value when
transferred to markets that are less similar to that in which it
originated.
Using the concentric index of diversification (Caves, Porter
& Spence, 1980) as a proxy for relatedness, Wernerfelt &
Montgomery (1988) find that narrowly diversified firms receive
higher rents (proxied by Tobin's q) than widely diversified
firms. This supports the resource-based hypothesis that
expansion by firms into activities in which they have comparative
advantages is most likely to yield rents (Penrose, 1959)
.
These empirical findings do not suggest, however, that
unrelated diversification is always ill-advised. Unrelated
diversifiers may have resources that give them a comparative
advantage over smaller atomistic competitors. Highly diversified
firms may successfully transfer resources across widely varying
markets. Montgomery & Peteraf (1989) find that these highly
diversified firms outperform atomistic rivals in fragmented
industries.
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Finally, Chatterjee (1990) notes that the vast majority of
empirical studies indicate performance advantages for related
diversification relative to unrelated diversification (Bettis
1981; Montgomery, 1985; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Palepu,
1985, Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Varadarajan &
Ramanujam, 1987) . However, even granting the resource-based
premise that related diversification yields higher rents, the
bidding firm will be unable to appropriate these rents in a
perfectly competitive market for mergers & acquisitions (Barney,
1988) . On the other hand, the bidding firm will achieve rents if
the bidding firm has private information, luck, or private
synergy which is not easily imitable or substitutable (Barney
1986c)
.
It is unlikely that private information and luck vary
systematically between unrelated and related diversification.
Thus, the "related principle reconsidered" (Chatterjee, 1990)
suggests that related diversification results in higher rents to
the acquiring firm relative to unrelated diversification because
of the greater likelihood of private synergy (value that is
idiosyncratic to the combined resources of the acquiring and
target firm) in the case of related diversification. For
mergers motivated by private synergy (efficiency or market
power) , the related bidder who shares the most valuable
relationship with a target is clearly in a better position to
outbid its less related counterparts while still retaining some
of the mergers economic value.
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Suppose the private synergy is $100,000. How much value
does the bidding firm receive? Here, we have a classical example
of bilateral monopoly. As Scherer notes: "The theory of
bilateral monopoly is indeterminate with a vengeance" (1980, p.
299) . Depending on the bargaining power of the bidding and
target firm, the bidder may receive anywhere from nothing to the
full $100,000. Firms, of course, will try to make commitments
to influence their relative bargaining power. For example,
antitakeover amendments may be implemented by managers of the
target firms in the target shareholders' interest in order to
increase the target firm's bargaining leverage to receive a
greater share of private synergy (Grossman & Hart, 1980)
.
In the case where the synergy is not private, the bidding
process will enable the target firm to appropriate the entire
value-created (Barney, 1988) . There must exist some type of
"market failure" in order for the diversified firm to achieve
rents via acquisition or internal development. Market failure is
an area of considerable focus within the organizational economic
paradigm and is critical for developing a resource-based theory
of the firm.
Resource-based theory within the
conversation of organizational economics
The organizational economics paradigm (Barney & Ouchi, 1986)
includes evolutionary economics (Barney 1986b; Nelson & Winter,
1982; Schumpeter, 1950), transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937;
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Williamson, 1975); property rights theory (Alchian, 1982; Jones,
1983) and positive agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976) . Theorists from these perspectives share the
resource-based theorists dissatisfaction with the neoclassical
theory of the firm.
The neoclassical theory of the firm represents the firm as a
production function that transform inputs into outputs. The firm
is a "black box" in which issues of internal organization are
suppressed or ignored. The neoclassical approach to the theory
of the firm (Samuelson, 1947) is characterized by an ideal market
with firms for which profit maximization is the single
determinant of action.
Barney & Ouchi (1986) note that positive microeconomics has
been dominated by a research program that emphasizes supply and
demand, equilibria, optimization analyses and industry structure.
The task of strategic management is to contribute value-added
insight concerning the structure-strategy-performance paradigm
(Bain, 1968; Porter, 1981; Scherer, 1980) and to get "inside the
black box" by analyzing the strategic firm (Rumelt, 1984) . While
industrial organization analysis attempts to characterize the
behavior of a "representative firm", the resource-based approach
focuses on the key success factors of individual firm behavior to
achieve firm-specific advantages via a portfolio of core skills,
coherence across skills, and unique proprietary know-how (Aharoni
& Sticht, 1990; Dosi, Teece & Winter, 1990; Prahalad & Hamel
1990) .
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The fundamental paradox of the neoclassical theory of the
firm is that the firm does not exist. The neoclassical theory
assumes away transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) ; limits on
rationality (Simon, 197 6) ; technological uncertainty (Schumpeter,
1950) ; consumer or producer learning (Lieberman & Montgomery,
1988) , and prices as signals of quality (Spence, 1974) . The
removal of these "frictions" leads to the conclusion that prices
are sufficient statistics (Koopmans, 1957)
.
This static equilibrium approach consequently does not
address the competitive process which is of central concern in
strategy (Teece & Winter, 1984) . In contrast to the stylized
model of neoclassical economics, the resource-based view is
concerned with a "strategic firm" characterized by a bundle of
linked and idiosyncratic resources. The view of corporate
behavior is most closely associated with Schumpeter ' s vision of
competition as a process of "creative destruction" rather than as
a static equilibrium condition (Barney 1986b, Lippman & Rumelt,
1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Phillips, 1971).
The resource-based approach may be framed in a dynamic
context. Schumpeter ian competition involves carrying out "new
combinations" including new methods of production as well as
organizational innovation (Iwai, 1984). This Schumpeterian
competition may be translated into the resource-based framework
by considering the firm's "new combinations of resources"
(Penrose, 1959, p. 85) as a means of achieving the goal of
sustained competitive advantage (Ghemawat, 1986) . Penrose
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(1959) , following Schumpeter, views the competitive process as
dynamic involving uncertainty, struggle and disequilibrium.
Firms accumulate knowledge as a strategic asset (Winter, 1987)
through R&D and learning, some of it incidental to the production
process. Indeed, Rumelt combines the Schumpeterian perspective
with the resource-based view by suggesting that strategy
formulation concerns: "the constant search for ways in which the
firm's unique resources can be redeployed in changing
circumstances" (1984, p. 569).
The resource-based view on distinctive competencies may also
be analyzed in an evolutionary context. The firm's distinctive
competencies may be defined by the set of substantive rules and
routines used by top management. Managers' past decisions, and
decision rules are the basic genetics which firms' possess.
Sustainable advantage is thus a history dependent process (Nelson
& Winter, 1982; Barney, 1989b).
The resource-based approach is also closely aligned with
other theories composing the organizational economics paradigm
(Barney & Ouchi, 1986) . Translating the transaction cost
approach into the resource-based approach, a firm is considered
both an administrative organization and a pool of productive
resources (Penrose, 1959) . In planning expansion the firm
considers the active juxtaposition of its own "inherited"
endowment of resources and those that it must obtain from the
market in order to carry out its program of activities (Barney,
1989b; Caves, 1980) . These factors are assumed to be
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semipermanently tied to the firm by recontracting costs and
market imperfections (Teece, 1982; Yao, 1988). Firm-specific
resources may result in sustainable performance differences
(Oster, 1990; Williamson, 1985)
.
The resource-based framework views diversification as a
response to indivisibilities and market failure (Teece, 1982)
.
The transaction cost, property rights, and positive agency theory
literatures provide the theoretical underpinnings for the
resource-based approach by analyzing the nature of market
failure. Market failure occurs when: there exists private
synergy and sunk cost (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982); property
rights are ill-defined (Alchian, 1982) ; externalities are present
(Dahlman, 1979) ; imperfect (asymmetric) information exists
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yao, 1988); and transaction costs are positive
(Williamson, 1975) . The result of these market imperfections is
that recognition, disclosure, team organization, monitoring and
dissipation costs are incurred in contractual exchange (Caves,
1982; Teece, 1982).
While market failure explains the existence of the firm
(Coase, 1937) , the resource-based view posits heterogenous firms
as the outcome of certain types of market failure.
Transaction cost analysis (Teece, 1984; Williamson, 1975)
suggests that idiosyncratic capital is an important source of
market failure and heterogeneity. Unique assets may take the
form of human capital (Becker, 1964)
,
physical capital (Klein,
Crawford & Alchian, 1978), legal capital (Alchian, 1982; Barzel,
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1989), organizational capital and experience (Huff, 1982;
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Prescott & Visscher, 1980; Spender,
1989) , and intangible capital (Caves, 1982)
.
The diversification literature, discussed above, emphasizes
the role of intangible assets in explaining heterogeneity.
Successful firms in most industries possess one or more type of
intangible asset technological know-how, patented process or
design, know-how shared among employees, and marketing assets.
Intangible assets are often subject to market (transaction cost)
failure. Even if the firm can market its intangible assets
effectively, it could not disentangle them from the skills and
knowledge of the managerial team (Nelson & Winter, 1982) . In
summary, idiosyncratic physical, human, and intangible resources
supply the genetics of firm heterogeneity.
Not only are there substantive areas of overlap between
organizational economics and the resource-based view of the firm
but there are methodological similarities as well.
Fundamentally, the organizational economics paradigm of
evolutionary economics, transaction cost theory, positive agency
theory and property rights theory attempt to explain the origin,
function, evolution, and sustainability of our "institutions of
capitalism" (Williamson, 1985) . The resource-based view is
expressly concerned with a specific institution, namely, the
rent-generating heterogenous firm and its origin, function,
evolution, and sustainability (Barney 1989b; Lippman & Rumelt,
1982; Rumelt, 1984). Debates concerning the validity of the
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organizational economics methodology (Barney & Ouchi, 1986) need
to be seriously analyzed by resource-based scholars.
While the resource-based view is intertwined with the
organizational economics literature, a case can be made that the
resource-based view is also complementary to the industrial
organization structure-conduct-performance paradigm. Valuable
resources are often imperfectly imitable and imperfectly
substitutable enabling the heterogenous firm to generate and
sustain rents. The susta inability of rents is a function of
"barriers to imitation", which have been a major focus of the
industrial organization paradigm considered below.
Resource-based theory within the
conversation of industrial organization
The resource-based view is complementary to the analytic
(Hill, 1988; Karnani, 1984; Schmalensee, 1978) and empirical
literature (Dess & Davis, 1984; Grinyer, McKiernan & Yasai-
Ardekani, 1988) based on the Bain-Porter framework (Bain, 1968;
Porter, 1985) . Peteraf (1990) provides a value-added
contribution to the resource-based literature by systematically
contrasting the "Harvard-school" Porter framework (1980) , and the
resource-based view of the firm. Peteraf also contrasts the
"Chicago-school" (Stigler, 1968) industrial organization view to
the resource-based view. The emphasis is this section is on the
common ground shared between these "two systems of belief"
(Demsetz, 1974) in industrial organization and the resource-based
approach.
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While the industrial organization literature focuses
externally on the industry and product markets and the resource-
based view focuses internally on the firm and its resources,
there is nonetheless, a duality between the economist's
constrained maximization problem of choosing a product mix to
maximize profits given resource constraints and the constrained
minimization problem of minimizing resource costs given a desired
product mix. Wernerfelt (1984) reminds us of this fundamental
principle: Specifying the enterprise's product mix enables the
researcher to specify the minimum necessary resource commitments.
Conversely, by specifying a resource profile, for the enterprise,
an optimal product-mix profile can be developed. Indeed, the
product market and resource market are two sides of the same
coin.
The resource-based view correctly suggests that focusing on
firm effects is important in developing and combining resources
to achieve competitive advantage, but this does not imply that
industry product analysis merely yields normal returns. On the
contrary, analysis of the environment is still critical since
environmental change "may change the significance of resources to
the firm" (Penrose, 1959, p. 79).
The essential theoretical concept for explaining the
susta inability of rents in the resource-based framework is
"isolating mechanisms" (Rumelt, 1984) . The notion of isolating
mechanism (at the firm level of analysis) is an analogue of entry
barriers (at the industry level) and mobility barriers at the
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strategic group level (Caves & Porter, 1977; McGee & Thomas,
1986) . In this sense, the resource-based view utilizes a central
concept of the structure-strategy-performance paradigm, albeit at
a different level of analysis. These isolating mechanism explain
(ex post) a stable stream of rents and provide a rationale for
intra-industry differences among firms.
Examples of isolating mechanisms are derived from the
resource-based theory, mainstream strategy research,
organizational economics and the industrial organization
literature (Table 1) . It is no exaggeration to claim that the
concept of isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984) is an insightful
and unifying concept. The crucial aspect for competitive
advantage involves the productive services of rent-generating
resources and resource combinations which cannot be easily
imitated or substituted.
Although the list of isolating mechanisms is impressive,
what is the generalizable insight? A careful examination of the
list of isolating mechanisms suggests that absent government
intervention, isolating mechanisms exist because of asset
specificity and bounded rationality (Williamson, 1979) . Or, put
differently, isolating mechanisms are the result of the rich
connections between uniqueness and causal ambiguity (Lippman &
Rumelt, 1982) . A reasonably comprehensive review of the
strategy, organizational economics and industrial organization
literature on "barriers to imitation" reveals the powerful
generalizable insights of these two seminal articles.
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The resource-based view is closer to the "Harvard School"
Bain-Porter framework in believing in the effectiveness of these
isolating mechanisms. The "Chicago School" view questions
whether economies of scale, advertising and R&D expenditure can
ever be a barrier to entry or isolating mechanism (Demsetz,
1974) . Many industrial economists take an eclectic view between
the two camps (Mancke, 1974; Phillips, 1976).
Peteraf (1990) argues that the resource-based view is closer
to the "Chicago school" in emphasizing efficiency rents than
monopoly rents. However, this distinction should not be taken
too far. As Demsetz notes, there is no reason to suppose that
competitive behavior never yields monopoly rents (1973, p. 3).
The resource-based view is closer to the "Harvard-School" in
terms of positing sustainable rents. This difference is due to
the divergent premises of the "Harvard-School" and "Chicago-
School" on the effectiveness of isolating mechanisms, as noted
above.
Thus, the resource-based view is intimately involved within
the conversation of mainstream strategy, organizational economics
and industrial organization research. The strength of the
resource-based framework is that it stimulates discussion between
various research perspectives. These discussions appear to be
generating new intellectual combinations of thought. Suggestions
for sustaining the conversation are considered below.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A fully developed theory of the expansion of the firm is a
formidable challenge for strategic management research. The
theory would involve production theory (Hayes & Wheelwright,
1984) , investment theory (Hirshleifer, 1970)
,
portfolio theory
(Sharpe, 1970) , organizational economics (Barney & Ouchi, 1986;
Williamson, 1985) , the theory of oligopoly (Friedman, 1983) , the
theory of international finance (Sodersten, 1980) , and so forth.
While not claiming to be a comprehensive theory of expansion, the
resource-based approach provides an illuminating generalizable
theory of the growth of the firm.
Reflecting back on the full set of articles published on, or
related to, the resource-based view of the firm, a few areas for
value-added research contributions are suggested:
1. Operationalizing the concept of relatedness . In terms of
empirical testing, research is clearly needed to provide
correspondence between the concepts of relatedness (Kazanjian &
Drazin, 1987) and its operationalization (measurement)
.
Relatedness requires analysis at the functional level (Abell,
1980; Salter & Weinhold, 1979; Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984), such
as marketing, product technology, and process technology, as well
as links between business units 1 value-chains (Rumelt, 1974;
Porter, 1985) . Relatedness also requires attention at the
corporate level (Grant, 1988)
.
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2. Integrating the diversification literature . The
integration of the literature on related diversification and
performance and the resource-based approach analyzing the
direction of the expansion of the firm will provide a major
advance in the field of strategy research. The resource-based
view may enable strategy researchers to synthesize the rate,




Integrating the diversification literature with the
organizational economics literature . To be a fruitful
comprehensive theory of diversification, the resource-based view
must also aid management practice on the choice of governance
structure (i.e. mergers & acquisitions, internal development, and
intermediate modes such as joint ventures) . The choice of
organizational form is of primary concern in organizational
economics (Williamson, 1985) . Integration of the emerging
resource-based view with organizational economics may provide
value-added insights on the implementation of diversification
strategy (Lamont & Anderson, 198 5) . Hybrids and networks may
involve the coordination of resources across firm boundaries
(Borys & Jemison, 1989)
.
4 . The development of an endogenous theory of heterogeneity .
A fundamental premise that distinguishes industrial organization
from strategic management is the strategy field's assumption of
heterogenous firms. It seems legitimate to require that the
strategy field provide a basis for its theoretical foundations.
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A major advancement in the strategy field is the development of
models where firm heterogeneity is an endogenous creation of
economic actors.
One approach is to integrate the resource-based view with
the organizational economics approach (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen,
1990) , in which heterogeneity is explained as an outcome of a
disequilibrium process of Schumpeterian competition (Iwai, 1984)
,
path dependencies (Arthur, 1989) , commitments and complementary
assets (Grant, 1990)
.
A second approach utilizes the equilibrium models (Shapiro,
1989) of industrial organization to explain the nature of the
heterogenous firm. Lippman & Rumelt (1982) , for example,
generate an equilibrium in which firm heterogeneity is an
endogenous outcome. Their model provides a persuasive argument
that firm heterogeneity may be sustained in equilibrium without
invoking ad hoc entry barriers. A second type of model stresses
"the heterogeneity (of managerial services) , their uniqueness for
every individual firm" (Penrose, 1959, p. 199). Oi (1983)
models the heterogenous firm as the equilibrium outcome of an
underlying distribution of entrepreneurial abilities.
An advantage of the disequilibrium approach is that time may
be viewed as the fourth dimension of resources (along with land,
labor, and capital, broadly defined). Time and attention are
scarce resources (Simon, 1976) and are sources of competitive
advantage that are neglected in single-period equilibrium
analysis. The approach of organizational economics (Barney &
28
Ouchi, 1986) of real heterogenous firms, competing in real
(calendar) time appears more relevant (and no less rigorous) than
orthodox equilibrium models. Nevertheless, contributions to the
field may be achieved on both fronts. Amit & Schoemaker (1990)
,
for example, analyze the sustainability of heterogenous firms
both in, and outside of, equilibrium.
5. Integration of the resource-based view with industry
analysis . Competitive advantage is a function of industry
analysis, organizational governance and firm effects (in the form
of resource advantages and strategies) . The resource-based model
has the potential to coalesce these research streams to provide a
rich and rigorous theory of the strategic firm (Rumelt, 1984)
.
Indeed, Wernerfelt & Montgomery (1988) give simultaneous
attention to the resource-based view, organizational economics
and the industrial organization paradigm and merits emulation.
Simultaneous attention to these research streams is precisely the
approach that warrants future research.
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I. Resource-based view/ strategy literature:
Mechanism Reference
Resource position barriers
Unique or rare resources which
are not perfectly mobile
Unique managerial talent that is
inimitable





Distinctive competencies and core
competencies that are difficult
to replicate





Dierickx & Cool, 1989
Barney, 1989a







Corporate culture that is valuable,
rare and imperfectly imitable due
to social complexity
Culture that is the result of human





Invisible assets that by their
nature are difficult to imitate
Valuable heuristics and processes
that are not easily imitated
Itami, 1987
Schoemaker, 1990
Time compression diseconomies Dierickx & Cool, 1989




Organizational innovation that is
characterized by a slow diffusion
process
Unique historical conditions in
which firm-specific skills and
resource combinations result in
path dependencies and heterogeneity
over time
Uncertain imitability due to bounded
rationality and causal ambiguity
Idiosyncratic assets





Private or asymmetric information
and knowledge as strategic
resources
First-mover advantages in acquiring
information and other valuable resources
that inhibit imitation
Firm-specific knowledge of buyers







Nelson & Winter, 1982






Lippman & Rumelt, 1982
Williamson, 1979
Demsetz, 1973
Reed & DeFillippi, 1990
Teece, 1986, 1987
Tomer, 1987
Klein & Leffler, 1981















III. Industrial organization literature:
Mechanism Reference
Investments that entail
high exit barriers and
high switching costs
Porter, 1980
High sunk cost investments Baumol, Panzar, &
Willig, 1982
Learning and experience curve




Legal restrictions on entry Stigler, 1968
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